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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I suppose the problems of interstate commerce are and will remain the 
most troublesome ones the Court has to deal with.  And, as you see, it is 
one that divides it repeatedly and deeply.  It is not surprising that our de-
cisions are often misunderstood and misinterpreted. 
Justice Robert H. Jackson1 
Since the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has invali-
dated economically protectionist state and local laws on the theory 
that such laws invade Congress’s plenary authority to regulate inter-
state commerce, even in the absence of actually conflicting federal 
legislation.2  This judicial vouchsafing of Congress’s potential exercise 
of its “dormant” Commerce Clause power has often been justified as 
vindicating the Framers’ vision of national unity.  However, the Court 
has not been entirely clear about the nature of the unity the Framers 
envisioned.3  Often, the Court speaks of encouraging political unity 
by suppressing fractious economic rivalries among the States.  But on 
occasion, another vision of unity emerges:  a laissez-faire-tinged vision 
of an efficient national market for goods and services. 
While the political justification has its roots in historical docu-
ments from the framing of the Commerce Clause, support for the 
economic justification is harder to come by.  Perhaps the most impor-
tant judicial precedent thought to support the market efficiency ra-
tionale in the anti-discrimination prong of dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine is Justice Robert H. Jackson’s majority opinion in 
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond.4  In Hood, Jackson wrote a veritable 
 
 1 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Donald Bain (Apr. 15, 1949) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 153, Folder 5).  
The copy of the letter in Jackson’s papers is unsigned, so it is unclear whether it was ever 
sent. 
 2 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 75 (1824) (holding the acts of the Legislature of New 
York that granted exclusive navigation of all state waters to two men were repugnant to 
the authority of Congress to regulate commerce under the Constitution). 
 3 Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 219–20 (“The wide-
spread endorsement of a judicially enforceable rule that state and local governments may 
not discriminate against interstate commerce appears . . . to arise from the widespread 
perception that this rule is a very good idea.  Though almost everyone seems to agree that 
the nondiscrimination principle serves an important purpose, there is some disagreement 
about precisely what that purpose is.”). 
 4 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
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paean to “free trade” on his way to striking down a protectionist New 
York dairy licensing law.5 
Jackson’s opinion was instantly criticized as the restoration of lais-
sez-faire economic theory to constitutional law and has continued to 
be criticized on that same basis.  But this standard reading of Hood 
presents certain difficulties.  Chief among them is the improbability 
that Jackson, a legal icon of the New Deal’s successful assertion of 
federal commercial regulatory power, would author an opinion cele-
brating laissez-faire economic principles.  Yet that is what some of 
Jackson’s New Deal contemporaries alleged.  And there is another 
puzzle:  recent conservative jurists who one might otherwise associate 
with pro-business, anti-regulation policy preferences have been 
among the loudest critics of this purported laissez-faire streak in 
dormant Commerce Clause anti-discrimination doctrine. 
Inspired by these puzzles and by intriguing developments in dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine under the Roberts Court, this Arti-
cle argues that the conventional reading of Hood as the case that    
(re-)constitutionalized market efficiency by means of dormant Com-
merce Clause anti-discrimination analysis is an example of history be-
ing written by the losers.  In this instance, the losers include Justice 
Hugo Black, who was more distrustful of judicial review over eco-
nomic regulation than Jackson and seems to have misunderstood 
Hood to be the second coming of Lochner.  The losers also include 
modern conservatives like the late-Chief Justice (and former Jackson 
clerk) William Rehnquist, and the current Chief Justice (and former 
Rehnquist clerk) John Roberts; these figures have misinterpreted 
Hood and other dormant Commerce Clause anti-discrimination 
precedent as being motivated by discredited laissez-faire principles, a 
guilt-by-association rhetorical move that serves their larger project of 
dismantling the jurisprudential limits on state power that were 
erected in the New Deal era. 
This argument is developed in two steps.  Part II provides some 
background on dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and its justifica-
tions, and presents the conventional reading of Hood as a constitu-
tional endorsement of the market efficiency rationale.  In this Part, I 
also present the criticisms made by the liberal Justice Black and the 
conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist, both of whom have asserted 
that dormant Commerce Clause anti-discrimination analysis after 
Hood is a laissez-faire enterprise.  With this background in mind, Part 
 
 5 Id. at 539. 
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III urges a re-reading of Hood.  This re-reading begins with a re-
examination of Jackson’s views as expressed in speeches, articles, and 
in Hood itself, to demonstrate how unlikely it is that Jackson would 
have intended Hood to be an endorsement of laissez-faire principles.  
From there I offer two related meanings for Hood that differ from the 
conventional narrative.  First, Hood represented a crucial break with 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine precedent that had effectively 
tolerated a certain degree of protectionist regulation in cases involv-
ing matters of peculiarly local concern—a development that infuri-
ated the populist Black and seemed to him to revive the specter of 
economic substantive due process.  Second, by making this break, 
Hood harmonized dormant Commerce Clause doctrine with the re-
ordering of federalism achieved through the contentious New Deal 
Commerce Clause cases, a doctrinal revision that would continue to 
needle latter-day conservatives who, to this day, remain intent on in-
stituting a “New Federalism.” 
II.  THE CONVENTIONAL READING OF HOOD AND THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE 
A.  An Overview of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Justifications 
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a judge-made corol-
lary to Article I’s positive grant of authority to Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce.6  Under this doctrine, States are restrained from 
actions adjudged to infringe on Congress’s potential exercise of its 
Commerce Clause power—that is, States are barred from certain 
kinds of actions interfering with interstate commerce even in the ab-
sence of federal laws regulating that area of commerce.  Under mod-
ern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, state and local laws 
may be found to improperly infringe on Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power in two ways.  First, state laws may result in protectionist 
discrimination that favors in-state economic interests over out-of-state 
economic interests.7  Laws of this type are subject to what the Court 
has described as a virtual per se rule of invalidity.8  Second, state laws 
that impose incidental burdens on interstate commerce will be up-
 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States . . . .”). 
 7 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 
(2007) (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994)). 
 8 Id. 
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held “unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”—a significantly 
more deferential standard than that applied to discriminatory laws.9 
Of these two categories, the desire to curb protectionism has been 
most central to the emergence and development of the doctrine,10 
and commentators have identified broadly two kinds of justifications 
for striking down such laws.  The first type is political:  protectionist 
laws lead to interstate rivalry and retaliation that may undermine the 
nation’s cohesion.11  This argument is often supported with historical 
 
 9 Id. at 1797 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Cent. 
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 525–26 (1989)).  Despite be-
ing more deferential, this standard has elicited plenty of criticism.  Arguably, it is this 
prong of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine which ought to raise the most suspicions 
about the Court’s constitutionalization of market economic theory, as it expressly weighs 
concededly legitimate state interests such as public health and safety against the burden 
that such measures place on the efficient operation of interstate markets.  For additional 
criticism of this standard, see John M. Baker and Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, “Drawn 
from Local Knowledge . . . and Conformed to Local Wants”:  Zoning and Incremental Reform of 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 42 n.189 (2006). 
 10 Thus did Justice Wiley Rutledge once describe interstate commercial rivalry as the “prox-
imate cause of our national existence,” arguing that the Philadelphia Constitutional Con-
vention resulted from the failure of the Articles of Confederation to address this prob-
lem.  E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 245 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 
WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25–26 (1947)). 
 11 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:  Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1112–16 (1986).  For a more recent scholarly ar-
gument supporting the political justification, see Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008). 
   A variation on the standard political rationale is the process-based justification:  eco-
nomic protectionism is the product of political processes and structures that favor local 
interests to the detriment of out-of-state (or out-of-town) interests.  See, e.g., S.C. State 
Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184–85 n.2 (1938) (“[W]hen the regula-
tion is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, 
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are nor-
mally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.”).  
Professor Williams argues that the process-based justification developed by Justice Stone 
in the 1938 Barnwell case “rescued the Dormant Commerce Clause from the doctrinal ob-
livion implied by [the New Deal era’s] commitment to judicial restraint and deference to 
the political process.”  Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Fed-
eralism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1905 (2007).  Although process-based reasoning was con-
ceptually an important development of this period and has cropped up from time to time 
since then, it is less clear that this development was essential to the continued viability of 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  For example, process-based reasoning played no 
visible role in the marquee dormant Commerce Clause opinion that is the focus of this 
Article—Justice Jackson’s decidedly non-deferential opinion striking down New York 
dairy laws in Hood.  In any case, for purposes of this discussion, I will treat process-based 
justifications as a subset of political justifications because in both instances the underlying 
concern is arguably the same:  erosion of political unity by means of economic favoritism 
at the expense of politically disadvantaged groups. 
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evidence.  For example, James Madison wrote to George Washington 
in 1787 fretting about the absence of a “negative” on the power of the 
States to regulate interstate commerce and the “rival and spiteful 
measures” that States inflicted upon each other as a consequence.12  
This rationale and its historic roots are also recognized in a number 
of Supreme Court opinions, such as Justice Kennedy’s observation in 
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown that the “central rationale 
for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal 
laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would 
excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was 
designed to prevent.”13 
A second justification sometimes floated to explain the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is that the Framers intended to 
encode a preference for national economic efficiency over state regu-
latory power into the Constitution, even if that preference was not 
explicitly stated there.14  In contrast to the political justification, the 
sources of this economic justification are more difficult to locate.  
One commentator has suggested that this rationale is at least implicit 
in the Supreme Court’s 1875 decision in Welton v. Missouri.15  In Wel-
ton, the Court struck down a Missouri law that required itinerant sa-
lespeople to obtain peddlers’ licenses if they sold goods made outside 
Missouri but not if they sold goods made exclusively in Missouri.  The 
Court concluded that Congress’s inaction in regulating this area “is 
equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free 
and untrammeled,”16 an outcome that has recently been suggested re-
flects “the ascendancy of laissez faire capitalism” in this period and 
the re-grounding of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine on the 
 
 12 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), quoted in Larry D. 
Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 627 (1999). 
 13 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (observ-
ing that the Commerce Clause reflects a central concern of the Framers to resolve “eco-
nomic Balkanization” that plagued the Union under the Articles of Confederation). 
 14 For a discussion of the economic justification theory, see Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 
234–51; see also Jim Chen, Filburn’s Forgotten Footnote—Of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 249, 265 (1997) (arguing that although the Court frequently disdains 
economic justifications for legal decision-making, the dormant Commerce Clause em-
phasizes economic substance over legal form). 
 15 91 U.S. 275 (1875); see also Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 161 (2005) (discussing the historical progres-
sion of the theoretical underpinnings of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 16 Welton, 91 U.S. at 282. 
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notion that congressional silence equates with a congressional will to 
“leave that matter to the unrestricted influence of the market.”17 
But while Welton may have been an evolution in dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine justification, it is less clear that the Court in-
tended to start a laissez-faire revolution.  For the Welton Court was 
plainly cognizant of the historic political concerns that motivated the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: 
The power of the State to exact a license tax of any amount being 
admitted, no authority would remain in the United States or in this court 
to control its action, however unreasonable or oppressive.  Imposts oper-
ating as an absolute exclusion of the goods would be possible, and all the 
evils of discriminating State legislation, favorable to the interests of one 
State and injurious to the interests of other states and countries, which 
existed previous to the adoption of the Constitution, might follow, and 
the experience of the last fifteen years shows would follow, from the ac-
tion of some of the States.18 
Granted, the Court’s treatment of congressional silence seemed to 
assume that a non-regulated “state of nature” served as the constitu-
tional baseline.  The Court did not, for example, conclude that state 
laws such as Missouri’s should be allowed to stand until Congress af-
firmatively acted to preempt such laws.  Instead, it seems to have as-
sumed that the Constitution envisioned an ex ante market free of go-
vernmental regulation, although even here this could very well be 
because such a view would best secure the political objectives identi-
fied elsewhere in the Court’s opinion. 
But even assuming for a moment that the Welton Court viewed 
economic efficiency as a constitutional good unto itself, the fact re-
mains that Welton predates by several decades the more overt consti-
tutionalization of laissez-faire economics under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Lochner.19  That move, of 
course, was later repudiated by the Court as the economic and politi-
cal realities of the Great Depression and the New Deal era finally took 
 
 17 Williams, supra note 15, at 161. 
 18 Welton, 91 U.S. at 281. 
 19 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment encompassed a freedom of contract which States could regulate 
only for police power purposes and subject to the Court’s searching scrutiny).  Justice 
Holmes’s dissent famously criticized the case for constitutionalizing laissez-faire econom-
ics.  Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A] constitution is not intended to embody a par-
ticular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to 
the State or of laissez faire.”).  For arguments stating that the actual significance of “the 
Lochner era” has been overstated, see Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 95, 100–02 (1999), and the sources cited therein. 
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hold through the 1930s.20  Thus, if one were looking for a convincing 
judicial source for a market efficiency justification for dormant 
Commerce Clause anti-discrimination doctrine, one would probably 
do well to locate such authority in a case that post-dates the demise of 
Lochner. 
B.  The Case for Hood as a Market Efficiency Precedent 
A very popular candidate for this role is Justice Jackson’s 1949 
opinion in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,21 a landmark dormant 
Commerce Clause case which, for all of its popularity in constitu-
tional law casebooks, almost never made it out of state court. 
In 1946, New York Commissioner of Agriculture C. Chester Du 
Mond denied H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., permission to expand its dairy 
operations by building a new milk receiving plant at Greenwich, New 
York.22  Hood already operated two plants nearby—one ten miles 
away in Salem and another twelve miles away in Eagle Bridge.23  Both 
of these plants collected milk from New York farmers for distribution 
in Boston, and the new Greenwich plant would have done the same.24  
Hood hoped that the new plant would allow it to take on twenty to 
thirty additional producers and help ease demands on the other two 
plants during peak season.25  At the time, New York law provided that 
the Commissioner was to issue such licenses only if he was satisfied 
that the license would not lead to destructive competition and was in 
the public interest.26  The Commissioner found that Hood’s competi-
tors in the Greenwich area already had excess capacity, and that the 
opening of an additional plant would result in destructive competi-
tion, milk shortages in underserved areas, and no public benefit.27  
Accordingly, the Commissioner denied Hood’s application. 
 
 20 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this freedom 
[of contract]?  The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.  It speaks of lib-
erty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law . . . . [R]egulation 
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process.”).  For a discussion of the legal, philosophical, and political pres-
sures weighing against Lochner in this period, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 621–22 (3d ed. 2006). 
 21 Hood, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
 22 In re H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 66 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946) (per curiam). 
 23 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 78 N.E.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. 1948). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Hood, 66 N.Y.S.2d at 733. 
 27 Hood, 336 U.S. 525, 528–29 (1949).  The Commissioner’s finding that the new plant 
would result in destructive competition was significant to the New York Court of Appeals 
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Hood challenged this determination before the New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, on the grounds that the Commis-
sioner’s findings were not supported by the record.28  Hood also ap-
parently argued in its brief that the denial of the permit violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but the Appellate Division’s 
tersely worded opinion upholding the Commissioner’s decision made 
no mention of the constitutional issue, and, remarkably, Hood did 
not include the issue in the company’s Petition for Review to the New 
York Court of Appeals.29 
Had New York’s highest court chosen to review the case only on 
the question actually presented for review—the sufficiency of the 
Commissioner’s findings—a case entitled H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du 
Mond might never have made it into the United States Reports and 
numerous constitutional law casebooks.  But that is not what hap-
pened.  In what was perhaps a sporting gesture to a losing plaintiff, 
New York’s high court found that because the constitutional issue was 
argued in Hood’s brief below, it was “available to appellant in this 
court” despite not being identified as an issue on appeal in the Peti-
tion for Review.30  Addressing this constitutional issue, the court rea-
soned that the State’s legitimate interest in curbing destructive com-
petition outweighed the purported negative impacts on interstate 
commerce.31 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the denial 
of the license impermissibly discriminated against interstate com-
merce.  The Court’s reasoning is discussed in greater detail in Part II; 
for now, it is enough to simply extract these classic lines from Jack-
son’s majority opinion: 
 
because the Supreme Court had previously upheld New York’s system of milk price con-
trols—which was justified in part by the need to curb unfair and destructive trade prac-
tices—against a Lochner-type due process challenge.  See Hood, 78 N.E.2d at 478–79 (“The 
commissioner, however, found that . . . petitioner’s proposed new branch would have a 
tendency to draw customers and milk away from local markets, and set up undesirable 
competition between petitioner and other dealers.  That was the kind of local milk situa-
tion with which the State is authorized to deal . . . .” (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502 (1934))).  See discussion infra Part II of Nebbia. 
 28 Hood, 66 N.Y.S.2d at 733. 
 29 Hood, 78 N.E.2d at 477. 
 30 Id.  The court cited Jongebloed v. Erie Railroad Co., 72 N.E.2d 627 (N.Y. 1947) (per curiam), 
in support of this conclusion.  The Jongebloed opinion, in turn, is exactly two sentences 
long:  “Motion to dismiss appeal denied, with $10 costs.  While no constitutional question 
was urged at the trial term, it is sufficient for our jurisdictional purposes that, as here, a 
substantial constitutional question was properly presented to the Appellate Division and 
was necessarily involved in its decision.”  Jongebloed, 72 N.E.2d at 628. 
 31 Hood, 78 N.E.2d at 478–79. 
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Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer 
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that 
he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home em-
bargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs 
duties or regulations exclude them.  Likewise, every consumer may look 
to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to pro-
tect him from exploitation by any.  Such was the vision of the Founders; 
such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.32 
Commentators like to cite this passage in Hood to show that the 
Court treats economic efficiency as an independent justification for 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,33 or at least that the “conven-
tional theory” does.34  And some of Jackson’s colleagues on the Court 
seem to have taken it that way as well.  Certainly Jackson’s fellow New 
Dealer Hugo Black encouraged such an interpretation in his harshly 
worded dissent.35  Joined by Justice Murphy, Black argued that the 
Hood majority’s approach reflected a judicial philosophy obsessed 
with economic theory, which he derided with an abundant use of qu-
otation marks: 
Some people believe in this philosophy because of fear that judicial tol-
eration of any state regulations of local phases of commerce will bring 
about what they call “Balkanization” of trade in the United States—trade 
barriers so high between the states that the stream of interstate com-
merce cannot flow over them.  Other people believe in this philosophy 
 
 32 Hood, 336 U.S. at 539. 
 33 E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 422 (“[T]here is an economic justification for the 
dormant commerce clause:  The economy is better off if state and local laws impeding in-
terstate commerce are invalidated.  Certainly this is reflected in the views of Justice Jack-
son quoted above.”).  This quote also appears in many law school case books, several of 
which explicitly link it to an economic efficiency theory of dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence.  See, e.g., NORMAN REDLICH ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (4th ed. 2002) 
(“Although the political rationale behind the dormant Commerce Clause has been do-
minant, the Court has also sometimes subscribed to an economic rationale.  As Justice 
Jackson wrote . . . .”); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (3d ed. 1996) 
(“Justice Jackson’s description of the political and economic benefits of free trade reflects 
the preconstitutional history of interstate commercial rivalries and the modern economic 
theory of free trade.”); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 235 (14th ed. 2001) (“As Justice Jackson’s opinion in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond 
elaborated, the dormant commerce clause thus advances national ‘prosperity’ as well as 
‘solidarity’: . . . .”). 
 34 See, e.g., Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and 
State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 78 n.30 (1980) (citing Hood for the proposition 
that “[t]he conventional theory assumes that the commerce clause embodies a free trade 
value and thereby implicitly restrains state regulation”).  It should be noted that having 
cited Hood for this proposition, Anson and Schenkkan went on to declare that “[t]he as-
sumption that the commerce clause embodies a free trade value is erroneous.”  Id. at 78 
n.31 (citation omitted). 
 35 Hood, 336 U.S. at 545–64 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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because of an instinctive hostility to any governmental regulation of “free 
enterprise”; this group prefers a laissez faire economy.  To them the spec-
tre of “Bureaucracy” is more frightening than “Balkanization.”36 
Black’s parting shot was to compare the majority’s opinion to the 
now-reviled economic substantive due process theories of the Lochner 
era: 
The judicially directed march of the due process philosophy as an 
emancipator of business from regulation appeared arrested a few years 
ago.  That appearance was illusory.  That philosophy continues its march.  
The due process clause and commerce clause have been used like Sia-
mese twins in a never-ending stream of challenges to government regula-
tion.37 
There is some indirect evidence that Black’s spin on Jackson’s 
opinion may have persuaded other members of the Court to change 
their views about the case.  Papers reflecting the Court’s internal de-
liberations show that seven Justices—Burton, Rutledge, Jackson, 
Murphy, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Reed—voted to grant certiorari in 
Hood, with only Black and Chief Justice Vinson opposed.38  After the 
argument, but before the opinion was drafted, all but three—
Frankfurter, Black, and Vinson—appeared to have voted to reverse 
and invalidate the Commissioner’s actions.39  Yet by the time that 
Jackson had written the Court’s opinion, two Justices—Murphy and 
Rutledge—had defected and joined Black and Frankfurter, respec-
tively, in their dissents.  Jackson’s eventual majority opinion was able 
to garner only five votes—and only then because Vinson—who had 
opposed certiorari—signed on.  Although hardly conclusive evidence, 
these shifts and realignments are intriguing and may suggest that 
Jackson’s draft opinion was received with a certain amount of skit-
tishness once Black had loudly proclaimed it to be Lochner redux.40 
 
 36 Id. at 554 (footnotes omitted). 
 37 Id. at 562. 
 38 Memorandum Recommending Grant of Certiorari (undated) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 153, Folder 4).  A 
handwritten note on the back of that memorandum indicates that all but Black and Vin-
son voted to grant certiorari. 
 39 Memorandum Documenting Votes at Conference (undated) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 153, Folder 4).  Al-
though this record is somewhat unclear, Vinson appears to have sat out this vote. 
 40 Black’s draft dissent was sometimes even more pointed than the published dissent.  For 
example, Black’s draft explicitly linked Jackson’s opinion to Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251 (1918), one of the pre-New Deal era’s more infamous affirmative Commerce 
Clause opinions in which the Supreme Court struck down a federal law prohibiting inter-
state shipment of goods produced by children under age fourteen on Tenth Amendment 
grounds.  Black wrote, “[T]he constitutional philosophy on which today’s opinion rests 
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In any case, Jackson’s ode to “free access” and “free competition” 
has endured, having now been cited approvingly in numerous Su-
preme Court opinions.41  Among these is another dormant Com-
merce Clause milk case, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.42  There, the 
Court struck down a Massachusetts program that required all milk 
dealers doing business in Massachusetts to pay into a fund that was 
used to subsidize only Massachusetts dairy interests.43  The Court 
found that this tax-and-subsidy combination operated like a tariff to 
“artificially encourag[e] in-state production even when the same 
goods could be produced at lower cost in other States,” and as such 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.44  The Court linked 
 
points ominously towards the day when this Court will once again assert such a broad ju-
dicial control over commerce as to restrict the constitutional power of Congress itself.  
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251.”  Hugo Black, Draft Dissent to Hood 18 (undated) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Hugo Black, 
Box 300, Folder 92).  The published dissent omits this passage. 
   Black also wrote in this draft that “the plain fact is that today’s decision goes far to-
ward forcing New York to restore the doctrine of laissez-faire in this phase of the milk 
business.”  Id. at 20.  And in response to Jackson’s observations that the Constitution 
“does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional action, 
nor how to draw the line between what is and what is not commerce among the states,” 
and that “this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the 
meaning it has given to these great silences,” Hood, 336 U.S at 535, Black warned that 
“there is danger in relying too heavily upon a constitutional command thought to have 
come from the Constitution’s ‘great silences.’  For judicial power thus discovered may on 
careful consideration turn out to be only an echo from the ‘great silences’—an echo of 
the interpreter’s own predilections.”  Hugo Black, Draft Dissent to Hood 18 (undated) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Hugo Black, 
Box 300, Folder 92).  Again, Black’s published dissent omits these passages. 
 41 E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 596 (1997) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Jackson’s “every farmer” language for the proposi-
tion that “the purpose of [the Supreme Court’s] negative Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence is to create a national market”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299–300 
(1997) (quoting Justice Jackson’s “every farmer” language for the proposition that the 
dormant Commerce Clause’s fundamental objective is to preserve a national market for 
competition); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 449–50 (1991) (quoting Justice Jackson’s 
“every farmer” language for the proposition that the Commerce Clause was intended to 
benefit those who are engaged in interstate commerce); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 
429, 437 (1980) (citing Hood for the proposition that a state’s decision to “hoard” prod-
ucts denies a consumer the protection of the free market); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (citing Hood for the proposition that the Framers 
intended the nation to be a common market, a “free-trade unit”); Allenberg Cotton Co. v. 
Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 31–32 (1974) (quoting Justice Jackson’s “every farmer” language as 
“expressing the philosophy of the Commerce Clause”). 
 42 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
 43 Id. at 193. 
 44 Id. 
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this “classic economic argument for free trade”45 to Hood—in fact, Jus-
tice Stevens quoted Jackson’s “every farmer and every craftsman” pas-
sage in its entirety as a kind of grand finale to his majority opinion.46 
Justice Stevens’s opinion, including its reliance on Hood, seems to 
have inspired in Chief Justice Rehnquist some of the same sentiments 
stirred in Black nearly fifty years earlier.  Dissenting in West Lynn 
Creamery, Rehnquist wrote: 
The wisdom of a messianic insistence on a grim sink-or-swim policy of 
laissez-faire economics would be debatable had Congress chosen to enact 
it; but Congress has done nothing of the kind.  It is the Court which has 
imposed the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which 
bodes ill for the values of federalism which have long animated our con-
stitutional jurisprudence.47 
Rehnquist’s strident, anti-laissez-faire dissent should give us pause.  
Few would accuse Rehnquist of having been an anti-business/pro-
regulation liberal; as Professor Tushnet once quipped, “[o]ne could 
account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s bot-
tom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, 
but rather at the platforms of the Republican Party.”48  Yet here 
Rehnquist loudly staked out an anti-laissez-faire position and came to 
the defense of a taxation and subsidy scheme to protect dairy farmers 
in the Kennedys’ backyard.  And this is not the only curiosity.  Con-
sider that Jackson, whose seeming praise of the free market in Hood 
served (and continues to serve) as the inspiration for judges to strike 
down state commercial regulations, was legal advisor to the New Deal 
when it was engaged in a death match with anti-regulationists.  Such a 
figure hardly seems a likely standard-bearer for a Lochner revival.  Yet 
such was Black’s accusation, and it is the criticism repeated by Rehn-
quist decades later. 
So what exactly is going on here?  Why did a New Dealer like Jack-
son seem to champion a market efficiency theory of the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine?  And why was a conservative like Rehn-
quist inspired to align himself with the anti-laissez-faire criticisms of 
an economic liberal like Black? 
 
 45 Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 234. 
 46 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 206–07. 
 47 Id. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 48 Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328 (1990). 
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III.  HOOD, RE-EXAMINED 
This Part proposes to solve the puzzles identified above by re-
reading Hood in a way that more thoughtfully fixes the role of this 
case in the development of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and 
federalism.  As a preface to this re-reading, it will be helpful to re-
examine Jackson’s views on the subject of economic policy, as ex-
pressed in speeches, articles, and in Hood itself.  From there, this Part 
places Hood in legal and historical context to identify two key doc-
trinal developments that are ignored by the conventional depiction 
of this case.  This Part concludes by arguing that Black’s and Rehn-
quist’s laissez-faire accusations are best understood as overblown, rhe-
torical reactions triggered by these two developments. 
A.  Re-examining Jackson’s Views 
1.  Jackson’s Distaste for Laissez-Faire Economic Theory 
Even a cursory examination of Jackson’s legacy should dispel the 
notion that he wanted to use Commerce Clause jurisprudence to   
(re-)constitutionalize laissez-faire economic philosophy.  Rather, 
Jackson viewed the Commerce Clause in New Deal terms—as the 
flashpoint in a struggle over the relative power of Congress and the 
States with profound economic and political consequences for the 
nation.  Thus, in 1940, Jackson wrote that the Commerce Clause “has 
been the focus of many of the most important conflicts between fed-
eral power and states’ rights,” and complained that it “forms the warp 
into which theoreticians have woven strange designs of laissez faire.”49 
It is certainly true that Jackson was not hostile to business; rather, 
he viewed free market prosperity generally as a good that could be 
guaranteed only by a strong central government empowered to step 
in and protect the market from itself when necessary—hardly the 
classical laissez-faire perspective.  Indeed, if Hood was intended to 
constitutionalize Lochner-esque laissez-faire, as critics from Black to 
Rehnquist have implied, it was very poorly drafted to accomplish that 
purpose.  For throughout the opinion, Jackson speaks warmly of sub-
jecting the economy to the unquestioned and salutary regulatory 
power of the federal government, including the power to erect barri-
ers to interstate and foreign trade: 
 
 49 Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court and Interstate Barriers, 207 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 70, 70 (1940). 
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This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has 
the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the 
vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has 
as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units.50 
. . . . 
. . . We have no doubt that Congress in the national interest could 
prohibit or curtail shipments of milk in interstate commerce, unless and 
until local demands are met.  Nor do we know of any reason why Con-
gress may not, if it deems it in the national interest, authorize the states 
to place similar restraints on movement of articles of commerce. . . . It is, 
of course, a quite different thing if Congress through its agents flnds 
[sic] such restrictions upon interstate commerce advance the national 
welfare, than if a locality is held free to impose them because it, judging 
its own cause, finds them in the interest of local prosperity.51 
Thus, Jackson’s vision of “free trade” is not trade free of regulation.  
It is trade free from destructive local protectionism, monopolism, and 
other market failures—goals obtainable by concentrating regulatory 
authority in the hands of the federal government, a key project of the 
New Deal. 
2.  Jackson’s Belief in a Unified Political/Economic Justification 
On the more specific subject of dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine, a review of Jackson’s writing before Hood and in the Hood opin-
ion itself confirms that Jackson regarded the prosperity engendered 
by a single national market as a happy byproduct of the political unity 
function of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, rather than as 
an independent justification for it.  In 1939, while serving as Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s Solicitor General, and thus as emissary of the New Deal 
regime, Jackson gave an address in which he declared: 
It has been the American commercial ideal that each workman, each 
farmer, each producer should be stimulated by the knowledge that he 
might seek the whole Nation as his market and stand equal with all com-
petitors.  Each American home should know the whole Nation as its trea-
sure house from which its needs might be freely supplied.  That ideal we 
cannot sacrifice to a self-defeating local selfishness.52 
The similarities between this passage and Jackson’s ode to free trade 
ten years later in Hood are obvious.  What is more interesting perhaps 
for our purposes is the context in which they were made:  Jackson’s 
 
 50 Hood, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949). 
 51 Id. at 542–43. 
 52 Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Solicitor Gen., Trade Barriers—A Threat to National Unity, Ad-
dress at the National Conference on Interstate Trade Barriers 11 (Apr. 6, 1939), available 
at http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/040639/. 
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address was delivered at an event called the “National Conference on 
Interstate Trade Barriers,” and was entitled, “Trade Barriers—A 
Threat to National Unity.”53  As that title suggests, Jackson’s thesis was 
that the most dangerous aspect of state and local economic protec-
tionism was the potential for political discord among the states—not 
the market inefficiencies that such measures can generate.  Indeed, 
in the next few lines from the address, Jackson declared: 
But over and above even the requirements of both our law and our 
prosperity are other values which we can not sacrifice.  Our security and 
our culture rest upon our sense of unity as one Nation with one destiny.  
It is no accident that the people of the several States are able to consider 
their differences of interest and viewpoint in peace and good will.  Our 
philosophy of local concession to the general good, expressed in the fed-
eration of local sovereignties in a single union, promises a culture of peace 
and good will that is the hope of the world.  Federation is the only tech-
nique by which large and common interests of widely separated people 
may be unified without the extinction of local initiative and local self-
government.  Transfer to a central authority of the power to decide the 
rule by which commerce shall move among the parts is fundamental to 
the success of federation.54  
Just as this address placed economic considerations in a position 
subservient to political ones, so too does the Hood opinion.  The opin-
ion first praised “[t]he material success that has come to inhabitants 
of the states which make up this federal free trade unit [as] the most 
impressive in the history of commerce.”55  But instead of stopping 
there, Jackson immediately turned to the political implications of that 
material success, writing that “the established interdependence of the 
states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate move-
ment of goods against local burdens and repressions.”56  At this stage, 
Jackson explicitly invoked the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine’s 
historical political justifications: 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Hood, 336 U.S. at 538.  In a draft of the Hood opinion, Jackson considered using the “fed-
eral economic unit” in place of “federal free trade unit.”  Robert H. Jackson, Draft Opin-
ion to Hood 15 (undated) (on file with the Library of Congress, Collection of the Personal 
Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Box 153, Folder 5).  What seems most significant about 
these revisions is the consistent emphasis in both alternatives on the “federal” character 
of the economic entity, reinforcing the notion that the market is not “free” in the classical 
laissez-faire sense but rather “free” in the Progressive or New Deal sense of being pre-
served by governmental regulation.  For a more current discussion of the constitutional 
dimensions of the American “common market,” see Norman R. Williams, The Foundations 
of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409 (2008). 
 56 Hood, 336 U.S. at 538. 
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We need only consider the consequences if each of the few states that 
produce copper, lead, high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas 
should decree that industries located in that state shall have priority.  
What fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such 
practices were begun!57 
Thus, to the extent that Jackson saw an economic efficiency argu-
ment behind dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, it was as a means 
to accomplish the larger objective of national political unity, rather 
than as a laissez-faire philosophical end in itself. 
B.  Re-examining Hood’s Doctrinal Contributions 
Before we can finally answer Jackson’s accusers, we have one more 
task:  to identify the two closely related doctrinal developments ren-
dered by Hood in the area of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
and federalism. 
Although this aspect of the case receives little attention now, Hood 
was criticized at the time for departing from a venerable line of dor-
mant Commerce Clause cases, extending back to 1851’s Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens,58 which made conceptual allowances in dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine for peculiarly local matters.  In Cooley, the 
Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law that required large ships 
leaving the Port of Philadelphia to either use local pilots or pay a fine 
used to support “distressed and decayed pilots.”59  Although in mod-
ern terms the law might be suspect because it favored local economic 
interests, the Court upheld it against a Commerce Clause attack as a 
proper exercise of local expertise over a matter of purely local con-
cern; in so doing, the Court purported to draw a distinction between 
matters best regulated under a uniform national approach and those 
that could be safely and better left to local judgments based on local 
knowledge of the problem.60 
In time, Cooley’s national/local terminology was eclipsed by other 
judicial formulations of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but 
the idea that some matters are best left to the locals was never fully 
displaced,61 so that even into the New Deal it was still cropping up in 
 
 57 Id. at 538–39. 
 58 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
 59 Id. at 313. 
 60 Id. at 320. 
 61 See BORIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF 
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.03 (1999) (citing and discussing cases that fol-
lowed after Cooley). 
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dormant Commerce Clause cases.62  During this period, the Court was 
shifting its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to a balancing 
model, but Cooley continued to lurk in the background.  Thus, when 
the Hood dispute reached the New York Court of Appeals in 1948, 
that court was able to quote contemporaneous Supreme Court 
precedent to conclude that New York’s law was “within the ‘residuum 
of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern 
which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or 
even, to some extent, regulate it.’”63 
Now consider the federalism implications of this lingering “Coo-
leyism” in the immediate aftermath of the brutal New Deal battles 
over the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  
The recurring argument that New Deal opponents had made in these 
cases was that certain subjects of regulation were reserved to the 
States and therefore outside of Congress’s Commerce power.  For ex-
ample, in Carter Coal the Court struck down a federal coal pricing and 
labor law based in part on the “local character” of coal mining: 
Everything which moves in interstate commerce has had a local origin.  
Without local production somewhere, interstate commerce, as now car-
ried on, would practically disappear.  Nevertheless, the local character of 
mining, of manufacturing and of crop growing is a fact, and remains a 
fact, whatever may be done with the products. 
 . . . . 
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle be-
tween employers and employees over the matter of wages, working condi-
tions, the right of collective bargaining, etc., and . . . it is insisted that in-
terstate commerce is greatly affected thereby.  But, in addition to what has 
just been said, the conclusive answer is that the evils are all local evils 
over which the federal government has no legislative control.64 
Similarly, in Schechter Poultry, the Court struck down federal industrial 
codes for poultry production on the grounds that such activity was 
predominantly intrastate, had only “indirect” effects on interstate 
commerce, and therefore “remain[ed] within the domain of state 
power.”65 
 
 62 Indeed, it has continued to do so even after Hood.  See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 
725, 728 (1949) (“Absent congressional action, the familiar test is that of uniformity ver-
sus locality . . . .”).  Justice Jackson dissented on preemption grounds.  Id. at 741–42. 
 63 Hood, 78 N.E.2d 476, 479 (N.Y. 1948) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 
U.S. 761, 767 (1915)). 
 64 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304, 308 (1936). 
 65 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) (striking down 
a federal industrial code regulating the sale of poultry). 
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In this context, the lingering Cooleyism voiced in dormant Com-
merce Clause cases of this period—i.e., the notion that there per-
sisted a “residuum of power in the state to make laws governing mat-
ters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect 
interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it”66—bore an 
obvious and probably very uncomfortable resemblance to the state 
sovereignty reasoning that drove the analyses in cases like Carter Coal 
and Schechter Poultry.  Eventually, of course, the Court’s thinking 
switched67 in regard to the affirmative Commerce Clause analysis, so 
that the Court more uniformly upheld Congress’s broad Commerce 
Clause power to reach even the most seemingly local, intrastate activi-
ties.68  Perhaps the starkest example of this new thinking was Wickard 
v. Filburn, which famously found that Congress was empowered to re-
gulate wheat grown by a farmer on his own land for his own personal 
consumption.69  The author of that opinion—not coincidentally—was 
Justice Jackson.70 
In this light, Jackson’s opinion in Hood might be understood as his 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine sequel to Wickard.  When Justice 
Frankfurter urged the Court to remand in order to develop the re-
cord on the question of whether New York’s potentially strong local 
interests in avoiding destructive competition ought to outweigh the 
relatively slight national interests in this particular milk dispute,71 
Jackson naturally had to decline because such deferential balancing 
in a protectionism case would have implied that the Constitution still 
contemplated that States should have a significant say—a “residuum 
of power”—regarding the need for such measures.  That clearly 
would have been a retreat from the theme sounded in Wickard, which 
in fairly spectacular fashion secured this authority for Congress at the 
 
 66 Hood, 78 N.E.2d at 479 (quoting S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767). 
 67 Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch in time that saved nine” is popularly portrayed as an ex-
ample of judicial wavering in the face of popular and political pressure.  For a critical re-
evaluation of this perception of Roberts’s judicial character, see Cushman, supra note 19. 
 68 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 256–59 (citing and discussing cases supportive 
of a broad Commerce Clause power).  For an alternative analysis, see Williams, supra note 
11 (arguing that the Court has never really been devoted to a “dual federalist” approach 
in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 69 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 70 Id. at 113. 
 71 Hood, 336 U.S. 567 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Cooley and arguing that “in 
the absence of federal regulation, it is sometimes—of course not always—of greater im-
portance that local interests be protected than that interstate commerce be not 
touched”). 
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exclusion and expense of the States.72  Thus, in order to make dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine thematically consistent with devel-
opments in affirmative Commerce Clause law, the old Cooleyist ac-
comodationism had to be rejected and a stricter rule adopted.  That 
is what Hood tried to accomplish, by declining to weigh the local in-
terests and by instead treating the law’s protectionist nature as virtu-
ally outcome determinative.73  After Hood, the “residuum of power” 
retained by the States to act in protectionist ways was really just that—
the mere residue of a once substantial power.74 
A re-reading of Hood thus reveals two closely related meanings:  
(1) for dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, Hood meant that local 
regulations of a protectionist nature would now be far more suscepti-
ble to invalidation because they undermined the Commerce Clause’s 
purpose of establishing political unity through economic unity; (2) 
for federalism, Hood meant that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
would reflect some of the thematic developments in affirmative 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the New Deal that had empow-
ered Congress at the expense of the States. 
With this lengthy background in mind, we are better positioned to 
understand Black’s and Rehnquist’s accusations. 
 
 72 Professor Williams forcefully argues that the Court has never fully endorsed dual federal-
ism (i.e., the division of federal and state regulatory spheres into neatly defined and 
symmetrical doctrinal categories) and has developed distinct and asymmetrical doctrines 
for each sphere.  Williams, supra note 11.  Nevertheless, Jackson’s project spanned both 
categories of doctrine:  to secure the constitutional foundations of a single, national mar-
ket under the firm control of Congress required at least some attention to harmonizing 
dormant and affirmative Commerce Clause doctrines.  Professor Williams observes that, 
before the New Deal, the Court “deployed the same terminology in reviewing federal and 
state commercial regulations and taxes, [although] its application of the doctrinal rules 
and its understanding of the underlying theoretical basis for the rules differed substan-
tially depending upon whether federal or state action was at issue.”  Id. at 1852.  The vet-
eran New Deal Commerce Clause warrior in Jackson would likely have been particularly 
attuned to the potential rhetorical dissonance between Cooley’s insistence on the constitu-
tional import of localism and the New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence’s rejection 
of precisely that value. 
 73 Hood, 336 U.S. at 542 (“[H]ere the challenge is only to a denial of facilities for interstate 
commerce upon the sole and specific grounds that it will subject others to competition 
and take supplies needed locally, an end, as we have shown, always held to be precluded 
by the Commerce Clause.”). 
 74 Indeed, only once has the Supreme Court upheld a state law that it has found to dis-
criminate against interstate commerce.  See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (uphold-
ing prohibition on importation of potentially diseased out-of-state baitfish because no al-
ternative means were available to secure the State’s legitimate ecological interests). 
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C.  Misunderstanding Hood:  Black’s Objections 
Justice Black’s objections to Hood are best understood as over-
reactions to the first meaning of Hood identified above—that localist 
regulations should no longer find safe harbor in the remnants of Coo-
ley still latent in the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine during this 
period.  Black’s views on economic policy were left of Jackson’s, and 
he tended to “translate[] his politics into his votes and opinions on 
the Court.”75  Indeed, during his confirmation, Black said that “there 
is no charge against the integrity of any prospective judge that with 
reference to economic predilections after he goes on the bench he 
will still be the same man that he was before he went there.”76  From 
this perspective, Black viewed Hood’s attempted disposal of Cooley as a 
step backwards in the struggle to secure the primacy of government—
at any level—over business: 
The consequences of the new formula, as I understand it, will not merely 
leave a large area of local business activities free from state regulation.  
All local activities that fall within the scope of this new formula will be 
free from any regulatory control whatever.  For it is inconceivable that 
Congress could pass uniform national legislation capable of adjustment 
and application to all the local phases of interstate activities that take 
place in the 48 states.  It is equally inconceivable that Congress would at-
tempt to control such diverse local activities through a “swarm of statutes 
only locally applicable and utterly inconsistent.”77 
Black’s fears that Hood would result in widespread deregulation 
may seem overblown today, and perhaps they should have seemed 
that way to Black given that he had just witnessed the rise of a power-
ful federal administrative state capable of reaching “all the local 
phases of interstate commerce.”78  But if we grant that these concerns 
may have appeared more plausible at the dawn of that administrative 
state, then we may also see how Black could have viewed Hood as 
something like the second coming of Lochner.  In both cases, the 
Court invalidated state commercial regulations, and in both cases the 
 
 75 Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 240.  Hutchinson 
notes that Jackson was not really different from Black in this regard.  Id. 
 76 81 CONG. REC. S2828 (Mar. 29, 1937) (statement of Justice Black), quoted in Hutchinson, 
supra note 75, at 240. 
 77 Hood, 336 U.S. at 545–46 (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Kidd v. Pear-
son, 128 U.S. 1 (1888)). 
 78 Id. 
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Court’s explanation linked constitutional doctrine to market eco-
nomics.79 
This reaction seems to have been further encouraged by Hood’s 
superficial similarities to another case with a very different outcome:  
Nebbia v. New York, in which the Court began to rein in the economic 
substantive due process analysis of the Lochner period.80  Like Hood, 
Nebbia involved a constitutional challenge to New York’s regulation of 
the dairy industry, in this instance a challenge under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to New York’s dairy price con-
trol scheme.81  Unlike Hood, the Court upheld the State’s dairy regula-
tions, and did so in terms that seriously undermined the continued 
vitality of Lochner-style economic substantive due process.82  The Court 
announced that “neither property rights nor contract rights are abso-
lute,” and that courts lacked authority to invalidate economic policy 
of any kind that that “may reasonably be deemed to promote public 
welfare.”83  Neither of the parties in Hood laid much emphasis on Neb-
bia in their briefs.84  But Black saw a connection between the two cas-
es—both reviewed state action that had been justified in terms of 
preventing destructive competition: 
The legislature believed that while cutthroat competition among pur-
chaser dealers temporarily raises the price of farmers’ milk, the end re-
sult of the practice in New York had been economic distress for the far-
mers.  After destructive dealer competition had driven financially weak 
dealers from the contest, the more opulent survivors had pushed pro-
 
 79 Among Black’s papers in the Hood case is an intriguing hand-drawn table suggesting that 
Black was intent on uncovering patterns in the Court’s recent treatment of State and lo-
cal regulation.  Hugo H. Black, Table and List of Cases (undated) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Hugo H. Black, Box 300, Folder 
92).  The table reflects eighty-one cases involving challenges to state and local economic 
regulation decided by the Supreme Court between 1937 and 1946.  The table classifies 
the cases according to subject matter (“tax,” “regulation,” “foreign,” “domestic”) and out-
come (sixty-three sustained, fourteen invalidated, two sustained in part and invalidated in 
part, and two with other notations).  The handwriting on this document differs from 
Black’s handwritten dissent drafts, so it is possible that it was prepared by a clerk.  Its in-
clusion in the same file as the draft dissents suggests that Black consulted this information 
while preparing his dissent. 
 80 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 81 Id. at 515. 
 82 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 622; see also Cushman, supra note 19, at 105–28. 
 83 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 523–24, 537, quoted in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 622. 
 84 New York’s brief cited Nebbia only to establish that New York’s dairy laws emerged from a 
period of destructive competition.  See Brief for the Respondent Commissioner at 9–11, 
Hood, 336 U.S. 525 (1948) (No. 92), 1948 WL 47268.  The Petitioners (unsurprisingly) 
did not cite Nebbia at all.  See Brief for the Petitioner, Hood, 336 U.S. 525 (No. 92), 1948 
WL 47267. 
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ducers’ prices far below production costs.  Nebbia v. New York gives a 
graphic description of the plight of these farmers prior to the enactment 
of these regulations and makes clear that the chief incentive for the regu-
lations was the promotion of health and the general welfare by financial 
rehabilitation of the farmers.  And despite due-process objections, the 
Nebbia case sustained the state’s constitutional power to apply its law to 
New York dealers in order to promote the health, economic stability and 
general welfare of the state’s people.85 
Black feared that Jackson’s opinion would end-run Nebbia and 
other cases that had rolled back economic substantive due process by 
substituting dormant Commerce Clause doctrine for economic due 
process as the constitutional basis for judicial hostility to state eco-
nomic regulation.  Of course, as the discussion above shows, equating 
Jackson’s motives with those animating the adherents of Lochner is 
simply untenable; but by this point in their relationship, Black was 
hardly disposed to extend to Jackson any benefit of the doubt.86 
Perhaps this animosity also blinded Black to the other crucial 
meaning of Hood—that continued tolerance of Cooleyist reasoning in 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was inconsistent with, and a 
threat to, the hard-won gains made in affirmative Commerce Clause 
doctrine in the New Deal period.  In any event, Black’s accusations 
against Jackson’s opinion were enough to persuade one fellow Justice 
to defect to the dissenting side, and as the next section shows, they 
would resonate years later in the writings of jurists on the other end 
of the political spectrum intent on rolling back those same New Deal 
victories. 
D.  Misinterpreting Hood:  Rehnquist’s and Roberts’s “Laissez-faire” 
Objections to Dormant Commerce Clause Anti-Discrimination Doctrine 
While Black’s objections to the Hood majority opinion flowed 
principally from a misperceived economic policy disagreement with 
Jackson, it appears that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s objections were 
principally animated by the second meaning of Hood identified 
above—its place in the tug-of-war over federal and state regulatory 
power. 
One of the most significant legacies of the Rehnquist Court has 
been to reopen the question of the scope of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power.  Consider that for sixty years after Justice Owen Rob-
erts’s “switch in time that saved nine,” the Supreme Court did not 
 
 85 Hood, 336 U.S. at 546 (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 86 See generally Hutchinson, supra note 75. 
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find a single federal law to have exceeded Congress’s Commerce 
Power.87  Then, in 1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored United 
States v. Lopez, which stuck down a federal law criminalizing gun pos-
session within 1,000 feet of a school zone on the theory that such 
conduct in itself did not substantially affect interstate commerce.88  
This shock89 was repeated five years later, when Rehnquist authored 
United States v. Morrison, invalidating an unrelated federal law on the 
same grounds.90  In this same period, the Rehnquist Court also suc-
cessfully redesigned and redeployed the Tenth Amendment’s limits 
on Congress in relation to state governments.91  These developments 
obviously flowed against the current of the previous six decades of 
expanding congressional power and shrinking state power. 
Of course, affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence and dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence have evolved into quite differ-
ent doctrinal creatures, and Professor Cushman’s warning that “com-
parisons made at the level of abstraction at which doctrinal categories 
are utterly ignored are not always the most illuminating” is certainly a 
 
 87 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 264. 
 88 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
 89 Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:  Shooting Down the 
Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1645 (2002) (noting that 
“Lopez sent a shock wave through both the judiciary and the academy” and led to a “wave 
of litigation challenging . . . other federal criminal statutes”); John C. Eastman, A Fistful of 
Denial:  The Supreme Court Takes a Pass on Commerce Clause Challenges to Environmental Laws, 
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 469, 471 (noting that in light of the sixty-year history of judicial 
deference to federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, Lopez came as “some-
thing of a shock”); Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced:  A Response to Pro-
fessor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069, 1085 (2001) (characterizing Lopez as a “shock”); Alex 
Kreit, Rights, Rules and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 708 (2006) (asserting that the 
“shock” of Lopez was due to the fact that most academics and lower court judges had as-
sumed that congressional power under the Commerce Clause was “limitless”); Seth P. 
Waxman, Foreword:  Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1125 (2001) 
(describing Lopez as a “shock” in the context of a Congress accustomed to legislating).  
But see Chris Marks, Comment, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and United States v. 
Lopez:  The Supreme Court Resuscitates the Tenth Amendment, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 553 
(1997) (asserting Lopez did not, by itself, “shock the legal community,” but represented a 
“trend towards capping federal power and breaking down the regulatory state”). 
 90 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). 
 91 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–26 (1997) (holding that the Tenth Amend-
ment prohibits Congress from “commandeering” state executive authority); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohib-
its Congress from “commandeering” state legislative authority); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (relying on the Tenth Amendment to adopt as a rule of statutory 
construction that Congress clearly stated its intention to apply federal law to important 
state functions). 
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sensible one.92  Nevertheless, it does seem that for Rehnquist, at least, 
the connection between affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence was neither abstract nor opaque:  both spoke to the 
“proper” allocation of federal and state power, a favorite theme of the 
Rehnquist Court. 
In this light, Rehnquist’s dissent in West Lynn Creamery may be 
viewed as his effort to enunciate the counter-Hood, just as Lopez was in 
important respects the counter-Wickard.93  In Hood, Jackson brought 
dormant Commerce Clause anti-discrimination doctrine into line 
with the themes of affirmative Commerce Clause precedent by virtu-
ally closing the door on any meaningful consideration of local inter-
ests in discrimination cases;94 in West Lynn Creamery, Jackson’s former 
law clerk sought to discredit the entire doctrine because of that de-
velopment, which he believed “bod[ed] ill for the values of federal-
ism which have long animated our constitutional jurisprudence.”95  
Thus did Rehnquist match Stevens’s invocation of Hood’s “every far-
mer” quote with another, maybe equally classic quote: 
More than half a century ago, Justice Brandeis said in his dissenting 
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: 
“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave re-
sponsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with seri-
ous consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
 
 92 Cushman, supra note 19, at 107. 
 93 Rehnquist had this to say about Wickard in Lopez:  “Where economic activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.  Even 
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in 
a school zone does not.”  514 U.S. at 560.  This characterization of Wickard limits that 
case, for as Justice Breyer argued in his dissent, Rehnquist’s use of categories like “eco-
nomic activity” and “commercial activity” revived the approach to Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence that produced cases like Carter Coal, with its production versus commerce dis-
tinction, and Schechter Poultry, with its direct versus indirect effects distinction—an 
outcome Wickard itself warned against: 
As a general matter, this approach fails to heed this Court’s earlier warning not to 
turn “questions of the power of Congress” upon “formula[s]” that would give 
“controlling force to nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and fore-
close consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate 
commerce.” 
  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)). 
 94 In non-discrimination cases, the Court would continue to balance local interests against 
burdens on interstate commerce.  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970). 
 95 515 U.S. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”96 
To Rehnquist, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine’s strict anti-
protectionism rules stood in the way of this laboratory-of-democracy 
value and thus in the way of his legacy-making New Federalism pro-
ject of reinvigorated state power.  To help push dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine out of the way, Rehnquist linked the doctrine with its 
most disreputable justification—“a messianic insistence on a grim 
sink-or-swim policy of laissez-faire economics”97—and downplayed its 
altogether more defensible justification—national political unity 
founded on economic cohesion. 
Despite these rhetorical moves, Rehnquist was only able to muster 
a dissent, albeit with Justice Blackmun joining in.  In a truly Mich-
ener-esque turn, it would fall to Rehnquist’s own former law clerk, 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, to successfully re-inject tolerance for 
local preferences into dormant Commerce Clause anti-discrimination 
analysis—nearly four decades after Rehnquist’s former boss had tried 
to banish it.  In United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Management Authority, Roberts carved out a “new” exception in dor-
mant Commerce Clause anti-discrimination doctrine, exempting 
from strict scrutiny review those state and local laws that economically 
favor local government enterprises engaged in traditional govern-
mental functions.98  This is not exactly Cooley, but it bears a striking 
family resemblance.99  Under United Haulers, a state or local govern-
ment may create local economic preferences that would otherwise be 
subject to per se invalidation—so long as those preferences are op-
erationalized by means of a public enterprise of some kind.  In reach-
ing this result, Roberts took a stab at penning his own enduring dor-
mant Commerce Clause quote, including yet another jab at the 
phantom of a laissez-faire economic justification for dormant Com-
merce Clause anti-discrimination: 
 
 96 Id. at 216 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)). 
 97 Id. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 98 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1796–97 (2007). 
 99 Intriguingly, Roberts expressly relied upon Cooley to establish the provenance of dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1792 (“Although the Constitu-
tion does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have long in-
terpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the ab-
sence of a conflicting federal statute.” (citing Cooley v. Bd. Of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 229, 318 (1851))). 
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[T]reating public and private entities the same under the dormant 
Commerce Clause would lead to unprecedented and unbounded inter-
ference by the courts with state and local government.  The dormant 
Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal courts to decide 
what activities are appropriate for state and local government to under-
take, and what activities must be the province of private market competi-
tion.100 
It remains to be seen how far this doctrinal pendulum will now swing, 
but it does seem clear that United Haulers has sent it back in the direc-
tion of Cooley and away from Hood.101 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
On April 6, 1949, Henry S. Manley—Jackson’s former law partner, 
the self-described draftsman of the law invalidated in Hood (“this is a 
confession and not a boast,” he noted), and the man who successfully 
argued Nebbia on behalf of the State of New York102—wrote a letter to 
Frankfurter and Jackson expressing his disappointment with Hood.103  
“As a small farmer of western New York,” Manley wrote, “I am one of 
the kulaks who feels endangered by the plenary Federal power over 
agricultural production and distribution revealed in Wickard v. Filburn 
and the limited State power revealed in this latest decision.”104 
As Manley’s letter suggests, Hood’s innovation was not that it re-
vived Schechter Poultry, much less Lochner.  To the contrary, Hood was 
an attempt to finish the New Deal project of securing Congress’s con-
trol of the economy by disposing of a potentially dangerous lingering 
tolerance for localism in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
dating back to the venerable Cooley case.  To Black, this represented 
an affront to the power of government to regulate business that 
smacked of Lochner; to Rehnquist it frustrated in some measure his 
project of a “New Federalism” with revitalized state power as its cen-
terpiece.  Both responded with the same unfounded criticism, tarring 
Hood and Jackson as “laissez-faire.” 
 
100 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796. 
101 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (applying the United Hau-
lers exception to uphold preferential state income tax exemption for government bonds 
issued by Kentucky state or local governments). 
102 291 U.S. at 510 (“Mr. Henry S. Manley . . . for appellee.”). 
103 Letter from Henry S. Manley to Felix Franfurter & Robert H. Jackson (Apr. 6, 1949) (on 
file with the Library of Congress, Collection of the Personal Papers of Robert H. Jackson, 
Box 153, Folder 5). 
104 Id. 
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To the extent that commentators and jurists continue to accept 
these false charges, they perpetuate a misperception that dormant 
Commerce Clause anti-discrimination doctrine is meant to advance 
laissez-faire economic policy.  They also perpetuate the misunder-
standing and misinterpretation of a central precedent in the New 
Deal reconstruction of our national, federal, economic, and (above 
all) political union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
